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People engage in terrorism and similar forms of violent extremism for a variety of reasons, 
political or non-political. In general, they do so to fulfill a dream, a need or an urge to do or 
achieve something. The frequent failure to achieve what they expected or dreamed about is 
also usually the source of their disillusionment, and subsequently, a main reason to disengage 
from violent extremism – providing that they are able to do so. 
 
Individuals who have been involved in violent Jihad or in other types of terrorist activities 
come from a diversity of social backgrounds und have undergone rather different processes of 
violent radicalisation. There is no single terrorist profile or a single root cause which is behind 
radicalisation into terrorism [1, 3, 8, 10:810, 18].
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 These understandings have led many 
observers to make two negative conclusions: 1) profiling in order to identify possible 
terrorists does not work; 2) some will also argue that it is futile to try to develop strategies for 
preventing these diverse radicalisation processes as no such measures will be able to fit them 
all.  
 
However, it is possible that if one size does not fit them all, tailor-made interventions might 
be developed. We will come back to that possibility later. 
 
                                                 
1
 For example, the Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005 [19] stated: ‗What 
we know of previous extremists in the UK shows that there is not a consistent profile to help identify who may 
be vulnerable to radicalisation. Of the 4 individuals here, 3 were second generation British citizens whose 
parents were of Pakistani origin and one whose parents were of Jamaican origin; [one] was an Algerian failed 
asylum seeker; [another] had an English mother and Jamaican father. Others of interest have been white 
converts. Some have been well-educated, some less so. Some genuinely poor, some less so. Some apparently 
well integrated in the UK, others not. Most single, but some family men with children. Some previously law-
abiding, others with a history of petty crime. In a few cases there is evidence of abuse or other trauma in early 
life, but in others their upbringing has been stable and loving‘ [19: 31]. 
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Profiling in order to identify specific individuals involved in terrorism or vulnerable to 
radicalisation into violence by narrowing down from a wider population turns out to be of 
limited use, producing too many false positives as well as false negatives: people who fit the 
stereotype of (potential) terrorists without being a (potential) terrorist; and real terrorists who 
go undetected because they do not fit the stereotype.  Profiling of dimensions, processes and 
pathways is far a more promising approach [12:60, 13]. By understanding these various 
processes and pathways there may also be some openings for identifying possible preventive 
interventions which may be used to disrupt processes of radicalisation into violence and 
facilitating disengagement.  
 
Several studies of diverse types of violent groups have – at least to some extent – been able to 
identify a limited number of types of persons involved in violent groups, and which are 
characterised by different background factors and paths of radicalisation. A German study by 
Helmut Willems [22, 23] classified perpetrators of xenophobic violence into four main 
varieties: ‗Right-wing activists‘, ‗Ethnocentric youths‘, ‗Criminal youths‘, and ‗Fellow-
travellers‘. These were characterised by different profiles in terms of political/ideological 
motivation, organisational affiliation, socio-economic background, education, criminal 
records, and the use of violence. A study of Jihadi terrorist cells in Europe by Petter Nesser 
[15, 16, 17] found that these cells typically consisted of four main categories of terrorist cell 
members - the entrepreneur, the protégé, the misfit and the drifter. Each type had different 
socio-economic background and related to ideology and politics in different ways. 
Interestingly, these two typologies are in full agreement in describing three of the four types 
of activists, even if the political and ideological orientations of these groups are very different. 
 
However, a problem with typologies or profiles based on static ideal types is that many 
individual activists do not fit in, or they fall between the ideal types and become indistinct. 
Typologies which work well for one type of group or movement may not work equally well 
when applied to another movement. An alternative and more dynamic approach is to describe 
individuals involved in extremist groups along several dimensions or continuums. A number 
of dimensions or variables could be included, such as age, gender or altruism/egotism, but for 
our analytical purpose here the four following dimensions are selected:  
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Ideological / political motivation ====== Non-ideological / apolitical 
 
Leader / high status in the group ======  Follower / strong need to belong to group 
 
Socially well adapted / resourceful ======  Marginalised / weak social resources 
 
High on sensation seeking  ======  Low on sensation seeking 
 
Figure 1: Dimensions of radicalising actors 
 
 
These dimensions should be considered as dynamic continuums rather than as static positions. 
Any individual may during his or her life or extremist career move from one end of the 
continuum towards the other. Thus, a person starting out as apolitical may become highly 
politicised and ideological, or move from being a follower to become a leader with a higher 
status. Quite commonly, individuals do not join an extremist group because they hold 
extremist worldviews; they adopt extremist worldviews because they have become involved 
with an extremist group for quite other reasons. A person may also start out as relatively 
marginalised and become socially better adapted and integrated into society – or may fall 
from a good position in society into the margins, e.g. due to involvement in violent 
extremism, being caught for crimes or drug abuse. Moreover, a person joining an extremist 
group in search of action and excitement may calm down with age or burn out due to constant 
pressure and exhaustion. 
 
Different extremist or terrorist groups may also be described as consisting of diverse mixtures 
of people who at any moment in time are placed at various ends of the continuum. Thus, some 
groups may have a large proportion of leaders and followers at the ideological and socially 
well adapted ends of the continuums. Other groups may start out with only a few of these as 
leaders and a larger proportion of marginalised and apolitical followers, some of whom may 
gradually become more politicised. These different types of individuals will usually perform 
different and complementary roles within each group [2:48-51]. 
 
Thus, the types described here, partly based on the typologies of Willems [23] (refined by 
Bjørgo [2]) and Nesser [17] should not be considered as static profiles but rather as positions 
which individuals to various extents may move towards or away from within processes of 
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radicalisation or deradicalisation – although some of their individual traits and qualities may 
tie them more firmly to some positions than to others.  
 
What follows from the understanding that terrorist groups may consist of different types of 
individuals who undergo diverse paths of radicalisation is not that it is futile to develop 
strategies of prevention to target all these diverse types. Rather, it follows that it is necessary 
to develop several specific measures which may fit each separate type or dimension. Some of 
these types are susceptible to socio-economic interventions, others to psycho-social factors 
and others to ideological and political issues. Thus, preventive strategies have to be tailored to 
the specific drivers behind each main type of activist and the specifics of the various groups. 
The different dimensions described above may help us to suggest several points of 
intervention in order to induce different types of (potential) activists to break off their 
processes of radicalisation or to disengage from the militant group they have been part of. 
Different strategies of prevention or intervention are likely to have different effects on 
different activists because they have different needs and vulnerabilities.  
 
Thus, the types or profiles described here should not be considered as a tool to identify 
potential terrorists. They should rather be seen as an aid to develop more specific and targeted 
strategies for preventing violent radicalisation and facilitating disengagement, taking into 
account the diversity of violent activists. The profiles below should be understood as ideal 
types, but not as static positions, as the typology is based on dimensions which represent 
dynamic continuums. Thus, it follows that during their extremist careers individuals may 
move from resembling one type initially into acquiring more of the characteristics of other 
types at later stages. 
 
Ideological activists 
One particular type of radicalisation process characterises ideological activists who play 
leading roles in terrorist cells. They are often charismatic persons motivated by idealism and a 
strong sense of justice, responding to the suffering of others – be it fellow Muslims or other 
objects of identification, globally or locally. Jihadism or other varieties of political violence 
are embraced through an intellectual process where the need to take action gradually becomes 
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a political or religious duty [17]. These altruistic persons are often resourceful, educated, well 
integrated and in some cases even considered as role models in their communities [21.
2
  
 
One particular variety is the experienced Jihadi veterans who have taken part in armed 
struggle at some of the war theatres for Jihad (such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Kashmir, 
Bosnia) and possess a certain heroic image as well as combat experience. They may also 
serve as linkages to the movement of global Jihad. Another and younger variety may be 
described as the protégé of the leader [17]. They tend to embrace Jihadism or other forms of 
militancy through a combination of loyalty to the leader and political activism. Although 
often intelligent, skilful and socially well adapted, they may also be impressionable and easily 
manipulated by the elders they look up to. 
 
Those who score high on ideological and political motivation may become disillusioned when 
they realise that the group or struggle does not further their cause or improve the plights of the 
population they claim to fight for. Thus, although some wanted to fight for the cause of the 
Muslims, it might be troubling that eight times more Muslims than Westerners are killed by 
al-Qaida, according to some accounts [11, 14]. They might also be troubled by contradictions 
between violent means and political ends, from engaging in behaviour that conflicts with 
one's beliefs, or other forms of cognitive dissonance. Although hard to persuade, they might 
in such circumstances also be challenged on ideological grounds.  
 
However, those who have scored high on leadership are also vulnerable to loss of status and 
confidence within the group. In such situations of status loss, the option of disengagement 
may become more attractive than when they were leaders everyone looked up to. Sometimes 
it might even be possible to ―help‖ leaders to lose status and confidence within their milieu 
through various forms of intervention (e.g. by releasing discrediting information about them). 
A combination of political disillusionment and loss of status or leadership role increases the 
likelihood of disengagement from the group and subsequent deradicalisation on the 
ideological level (which often is a gradual process). This may also be reinforced by a 
tendency towards exhaustion and burn-out among individuals who have been highly 
committed over a long period, in particular if they live under high pressure and danger. 
                                                 
2
 One striking example is the leader of the London 7-7 (2005) bombers, Mohammad Sidique Khan, who was 
well educated and a well-regarded community activist involved in voluntary work for youths and children [17: 
102-4]. 
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There is also an added value when such leading people disengage because they may provide 
powerful messages to warn young people against joining such extremist movements, and may 
also open the path of disengagement for other discontent participants in the movement they 
belonged to. What made them leaders and spokesmen for radicalisation may also make them 
important leaders for disengagement and deradicalisation, having a special credibility due 
their experience. There are several prominent examples of this from (pro-)Jihadi groups as 
well as from neo-Nazi and other types of violent radical groups. Sometimes they also play 
important roles in establishing, figure-heading and/or running organisations or programmes 
for disengagement and deradicalisation, such as the Exit programmes for former neo-Nazis in 
Sweden and Germany, the Indonesian programme for rehabilitating members of Jema’a 
Islamiya, and the Quillam Foundation established by British ex-militant Islamists [7]. 
 
Drifters and followers 
For some youths, the experience of belonging to a group and being accepted by peers or 
leaders is a primary value, sometimes overruling most other considerations. What kind of 
group and cause they end up with is often a matter of chance and situation. Being part of a 
militant group provides a powerful identity. They seek friends, comradeship, protection and 
fulfillment of a number of social needs [21:86-7, 23, 2:201-7]. Ideology does not matter much 
to these drifters, at least initially, neither are they holding any particularly extremist 
worldviews nor exhibit any pronounced political attitudes. Neither are their backgrounds 
typically characterised by socio-economic problems, unemployment or dropping out of school 
– although having experienced loneliness and having been victims of bullying is rather 
common (2:203-4; 6:107-9, 4:56-7]. The search for community and group solidarity plays an 
important role in attracting them to these groups. When it comes to readiness for violence, 
group-dynamic aspects (conformity and the need to impress the others) are decisive. They do 
not typically display any fundamental readiness to violence or general hatred to specific 
enemies on their own. They may, however, be quite willing to carry out acts of violence in 
order to prove themselves in the eyes of others in the group, or may take part in order not to 
leave the others in the lurch [23:173]. They are rarely initiators of radicalisation into extremist 
ideology or violence, but are, by definition, supporters and followers.  
 
A special variety of drifters concerns converts. This could be converts to Islam who become 
part of Jihadi cells; or non-whites who become part of militant neo-Nazi groups; or 
7 
 
individuals from an ethno-national majority who become members of a group fighting for the 
rights or secession of a ethno-national minority. Because these odd individuals are somewhat 
out of place, they feel a strong need to prove themselves as a worthy and trusted member of 
the group. They may try to achieve this by expressing strong ideological views and 
willingness to commit acts of violence. Thus, they might appear as among the most extreme 
members of the group, at least at the level of expression. Some individuals of this type have 
rather marginalised backgrounds and are in it for their own sake (see below); others might be 
resourceful and altruistic. 
 
Those who score low on ideological and political motivation are easier to sway away from the 
cause, although ideological debates may not necessarily address their main concerns. If they 
are mainly motivated by companionship and the need to belong to a group, they are also 
highly vulnerable to disillusionment if the friends, the group or the leaders do not live up to 
the high expectations of friendship, loyalty and leadership.  
 
Ex-members of militant neo-Nazi groups have recounted how leaders tried to manipulate 
them to get involved in acts of violence they themselves were not comfortable with, using 
pressure as well as promises of rewards to induce them [2:217-218]. People who have 
volunteered for Jihad to fight the American invaders in Iraq or Afghanistan have told about 
how the local leaders tried to persuade them to take part in suicide attacks – not at all what 
they came for. Defectors from the Colombian FARC guerillas and other militant groups left 
the group because they were disappointed by the double standards of the leaders – demanding 
sacrifice and an ascetic life-style from the foot-soldiers while the leaders were enjoying the 
good life [20:160].  
 
Having high expectations about friendship, loyalty and comradeship, it will come as a strong 
disappointment that life in a militant group is often characterized by paranoia, distrust, back-
stabbing and betrayal. Pressure from outside and the fear of infiltration produce a strong sense 
of paranoia within the group, and this may often cause people to accuse one another of being 
infiltrators or potential traitors. Disseminating scandalous rumours and stories about other 
members is also a common practice in some extremist groups – in particular in some of the 
neo-Nazi groups I studied [2:217-219; see also 20:160].  
 
8 
 
A British militant Islamist, Maajid Nawaz, was arrested on his arrival to Egypt. He spent 
months and years rotting in an Egyptian prison. None of his friends in the Islamist movement 
ever tried to contact him or help him – he was left to his own destiny. The only ones who 
intervened on his behalf and tried to get him out was – surprise – Amnesty International. 
When he was finally released, he left the Jihadist movement and became a co-founder of the 
Quilliam Foundation, a British think-tank working to counter violent radicalisation.
3
 
 
For those primarily motivated by a need for belonging, alternative groups or new ―significant 
others‖ might replace bonds to the radicalised group or cell. Devotion to a romantic partner 
outside the group or parental obligations for children may also lead the young person to leave 
the group due to conflicting loyalties and commitments and setting different priorities. 
Interestingly, both the Exit projects for facilitating disengagement from right-wing extremist 
group, and the Saudi rehabilitation programme for Jihadis have in different (culture  specific) 
ways tried to involve families and prospective spouses as a way of tying these ex-activists up 
in social commitments and ties. The Saudi programme actually helped to arrange and finance 
weddings for graduates of their rehabilitation programme [9:217]. In a very difficult 
Scandinavian context, the Exit programmes were very much aware of the reintegrating effects 
for ex-extremists of finding girl-/boyfriends outside the militant scene but could not go further 
than helping the clients to get into mainstream social groups and activities where chances 
were good for meeting persons of the opposite sex [2:222; 5:140]. 
 
 
Socially frustrated youths  
go through quite different paths of radicalisation into militancy and terrorism. Usually they 
have a personal (real or imagined) experience of discrimination or unfair competition with 
other groups over scarce resources, feeling that they have no prospects for a good future [23, 
2:49-50, 330-332]. They have limited education or other forms of social capital and may 
suffer from unemployment and economic hardship. They usually do not hold any firm 
extremist ideas or ideologies, at least initially. Violence against enemies is legitimised less by 
reference to ideology or political strategies than by diffuse feelings of anger. At the extreme 
end of this dimension are criminal and marginalised individuals who are characterised by 
even more negative social backgrounds and careers, and especially by having a long and often 
                                                 
3
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amnesty-international/the-story-of-maajid-nawaz_b_370528.html; 
http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/maajid-nawaz.html.   
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varied criminal record. They tend to be school drop-outs and unemployed. The family 
background is particularly problematic: Broken families, parental substance abuse, the use of 
violence as a means of discipline and communication within the family, family members 
killed in war, or other traumatic experiences. They are action-oriented, aggressive and have a 
high readiness for violence. However, violence is not a means in a political struggle, but 
rather an everyday element in handling conflicts [23]. This type of activist is not an idealist 
but embraces violent activism to cope with personal problems [17:93-4]. This pattern of 
recruitment and radicalization into Jihadism has been referred to as a form of personal 
salvation, ―self healing‖ or conversion. In spite of their troubled backgrounds and lack of 
discipline, such persons may be an asset to the group due to their high readiness for – and 
experience with – violence, and competence in other forms of criminal activities in order to 
generate funding for terrorist projects. 
 
Some join terrorist or other militant groups because they are attracted by the violence, 
militancy and excitement. They may have fantasies about the adventures and heroism of being 
involved in a militant struggle. It is the ultimate fulfillment of masculine ideals – being a real 
man. However, reality may be disappointing. Life as a terrorist may be boring most of the 
time, with endless waiting for action without anything happening. On the other hand, those 
attracted by action may get more than they asked for. Being the hunter may be demanding; 
being the prey hunted by police, military and intelligence forces may be extremely stressful 
and exhausting in the long run. The reality of killing or wounding others may also be 
shocking. The pain, suffering and screaming of victims, often innocent civilians, may make 
them feel bad. The death or suffering of wounded comrades is not at all as glorious as they 
had expected.  
 
Socio-economic policies may have a preventive function in relation to those who are affected 
by discrimination, unemployment and various forms of social, economic and cultural 
marginalisation. This is the case with some proportion of those who have been involved in 
various types of terrorism in Europe but hardly the majority of them. Some measures should 
be directed at entire populations or minority groups among them (such as newly arrived 
immigrants) in order to facilitate general integration into society (primary prevention); other 
interventions should be targeted at risk categories, e.g. youths from poor Muslim households 
in inner-city areas (secondary prevention); and some social measures should target 
specifically young people who are already involved with extremist groups, such as training 
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for jobs where they can interact socially with positive role models and get prospects for a 
more positive future (tertiary prevention).  
 
Concluding remarks 
The processes of becoming engaged in militant extremist groups have some important 
bearings on the processes of disengagement. Disillusionment about what initially attracted 
them into the movement – whether that was political goals, a search for friendship or a sense 
of belonging and purpose – is one of the main factors leading towards a process of leaving the 
militant movement or group. However, disengagement is far from being a simple reversal or 
mirror-image of the initial process of engagement in militant extremism. In the course of their 
extremist careers, individual activists tend to change values and motivations as well as 
positions and roles within the militant group. What brought them into militant activities or 
groups in the first place may or may not be the same as what sustains their continued 
involvement. Still, a better understanding of the processes causing disillusionment for 
different types of militant activists may offer possibilities for reinforcing these processes and 
facilitating a higher rate of individual disengagement from extremist groups and activities. 
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